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* European Central Bank. 
    1 Introduction.
The managerial corporation1 is the most pervasive form of industrial organiza-
tion worldwide. Virtually everywhere, notwithstanding marked cross-countries
di⁄erences in terms of ￿nancial structure and legal framework, a crucial source
of capital for non-￿nancial corporations is outside equity, a large part of it typ-
ically dispersed in the hands of a multitude of small shareholders. Managers
run the ￿rm on a day-by-day basis with little, if any, explicit interference from
investors. Furthermore, as a large part of the on-going investment is ￿nanced
from cash from continuing operations, the manager enjoys a degree of discretion
about the split of current cash-￿ ows in pay-out and investment. Starting with
the seminal contribution by Berle and Means (1932), the issue of the separation
between ownership and control, and the ensuing lack of managerial commitment
to the pursuit of shareholder value, has been the object of constant debate. A
host of issues are constantly discussed. What are the checks and balances able
to limit the potential for managerial misbehaviour? What is a desirable extent
of investors control - symmetrically, of managerial discretion? What are the
determinants of the allocation of control rights to insiders vs. outsiders?
The chance of management removal whereby a take-over from an hostile
raider combined with the disciplining e⁄ect of market monitoring via trading in
the ￿rm￿ s stock have been widely seen as e⁄ective control mechanisms. Indeed,
most of the research has focused on the US, where the market for corporate
control has ￿ ourished, against the backdrop of highly developed capital mar-
kets. However, the "external" discipliner view is not entirely convincing: on a
logical level, it requires that some external discipliner is continuously present
during all the life of the ￿rm. Outside the Anglo-American world, not only are
stock markets much less developed, in terms of capitalization, liquidity, sectoral
diversi￿cation and investor base, and therefore less reliable for the purpose of
1I am indebted to the late Antoine Faure-Grimaud for his guidance and patience. I have
also bene￿ted from valuable comments from V. Cuæat, G. Chemla and L. Ferraris, two anony-
mous referees, as well as from participants at seminars at the bank of Italy and London School
of Economics. Of course, remaining errors are mine.
The author is currently with DG-Financial Stability at the European Central Bank, Kaiser-
strasse 29, 60311, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the author and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the European central Bank or the Eu-
rosystem.
5accurate monitoring, but the take-over threat itself seems of limited relevance
as take-overs are much less common events. Second, even though in the Anglo-
American world take-overs are a frequently used device to transfer ownership
and/or control, historically they seem to appear in clusters, instead of being
homogenously distributed over time. Finally, even in the US take-over laws
exhibit a large degree of variability at the federal level and have been chang-
ing over time, while corporations charters often include provisions that make
take-overs more di¢ cult.
In parallel, the literature has also stressed the strategic role of large share-
holders for curbing managerial opportunism and therefore increasing e¢ ciency.
Empirically, it is usual to distinguish two models: the Anglo-American model
relies on external/market discipliners while the Continental Europe model re-
lies on internal mechanisms based on the presence of large shareholders. In-
deed, a certain degree of concentration of ownership is the norm outside the
Anglo-American world, where instead equity tends to be more disperse. This is
especially true for continental Europe, markedly in France, Germany and Italy.
However, some authors2 have challenged on the empirical side this standard di-
chotomy, showing that the presence of large shareholders in the US corporations
is much more relevant than commonly thought.
With these considerations in the background, this paper presents a theory
of the managerial ￿rm abstracting from external discipliners, in order to em-
phasize the role of internal discipliners for the purpose of the maximization of
shareholders￿value. I focus on the interplay between ￿rm fundamentals (like
the time pattern of pro￿ts, growth potential, riskiness, availability of internal
cash ￿ ows), managerial incentives and the concentration of outside equity.
The driving force of the model is the well known trade-o⁄ incentives vs.
control in presence of free cash ￿ ows. Managerial opportunism creates a time-
consistency problem in terms of the optimal pay-out/investment rule. Ex-ante,
the objective of value maximization makes a case for managerial extended con-
trol over short-term pro￿ts, while tighter investors￿control is the ex-post e¢ cient
arrangement. Hence, the e¢ cient ex-ante pay-out policy is di⁄erent from the
ex-post rule. An appropriate control-switch mechanism is needed to strike an
e¢ cient trade-o⁄between managerial initiative leading to value creation on the
one side and rent-seeking behaviour leading to value destruction on the other
2See Anderson and Reeb (2003, and the references therein) for evidence in this sense.
6side. Otherwise stated, investors￿e⁄ective control powers must be ￿ne-tuned
between the two extremes of passivity and continuous intervention, in order to
limit managerial discretion in absence of a credible commitment to behave.
The analysis relies on some key modelling hypotheses:
￿ short-term cash ￿ ows are subject to uncertainty beyond the control of
economic agents (exogenous or intrinsic uncertainty);
￿ ￿rm-speci￿c non-contractible investment on behalf of management a⁄ects
both managerial utility and long-term pro￿tability;
￿ continuation project (growth option) requires further investment from in-
ternal funds, beyond the original funding provided by outside investors;
￿ managerial non-contractible private bene￿ts are explicitly de￿ned on re-
tained earnings;
￿ shareholders can, subject to an exogenous cost of intervention, overrule
managerial decisions and implement their favourite policy.
The paper builds on the model developed by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi
(1997). Assuming non-contractible asset-speci￿c e⁄ort and ex-ante monitoring,
they show that a concentrated claim in the hands of a relatively large monitoring
investor maximises the value of the ￿rm. Given the static set-up of their model,
when investors￿control takes the form of ex-ante monitoring, the nature of the
claim remains ambiguous between debt and equity, as the pay-o⁄ pro￿le is the
same for both securities. Instead, when ex-ante monitoring is substituted by an
interim costly intervention threat, they show that equity can be associated with
state-contingent e⁄ective control rights, and a clear-cut case for concentrated
equity emerges.
Compared to Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), the novel features of
this work are twofold. First, the introduction of exogenous uncertainty about
short-term earnings captures the role of ￿nancial constraints at the reinvestment
stage. Second, the distinction between short and long-term performance allows
us to explicitly root the con￿ ict of interests on the control over the internal
funds (free cash ￿ ows) accruing to the ￿rm in the short-run. In this respect,
I assume that the reinvestment decision is non-contractible, thereby building
7on Myers￿(2000) insight that "verifying new investment at the moment cash is
committed requires [...] understanding of the purposes for which cash is spent".
The ￿rst step of the analysis regards the characterization of the optimal
contract. The second best contract is shown to display state-contingency3 of both
security and control (intervention) rights. Furthermore, it has the nature of a
residual claim on the value of the ￿rm, which internalizes the e⁄ect of managerial
incentives on the growth option and is aligned with the interest of minority
investors. I then show that an appropriate ownership concentration of outside
equity implements the second best contract. As standard in incentive vs. control
theories, the trade-o⁄leads to an equity capital structure where a relatively large
blockholder coexists with a large number of atomistic shareholders. The large
shareholder exerts the dividend pressure forcing the manager to stick to the
ex-ante e¢ cient pay-out policy. Her threat of intervention has the nature of a
public good, due to the free riding behavior of the dispersed equityholders.
The new results and empirical predictions I derive can be classi￿ed in two
cathegories: (i) the relationship between ￿rm fundamentals, including liquidity
constraints, and equity ownership and (ii) the pay for luck phenomenon.
The relationship between ￿rm fundamentals and concentration.
First, the optimal concentration is (strictly) negatively related to the growth
options of the ￿rm and (weakly) positively related to the short-term perfor-
mance. In the model, higher growth options tilt the incentives vs. control
trade-o⁄ towards the incentives side. It is then e¢ cient to increase the extent
of managerial discretion. As a result, investors￿e⁄ective control powers are
diminished. For that purpose, concentration has to be lower, given that the
ability to commit the management to a certain pay-out policy is increasing in
the blockholder equity stake. In presence of a positive cost of intervention, only
a su¢ ciently large claim makes credible the threat of management removal by
shareholders. By contrast, higher short-term earnings increase the e¢ cient pay-
out ratio and diminish the optimal degree of managerial discretion. Since the
dividend pressure exerted by the blockholder must be higher, so must be the
concentration.
Second, concentration is negatively related to the riskiness of the ￿rm, as
captured by short-term exogenous uncertainty. A low value of short-term earn-
3With respect to the source of exogenous uncertainty.
8ings may result in ￿nancial constraints on investment. In turn, the ￿nancial
constraint has a negative e⁄ect on managerial incentives, adding risk to her
compensation and reducing e⁄ort. When this is the case, concentration has to
decrease in order to restore an e¢ cient balance between incentives and control.
Third, concentration turns out to be negatively related to the probability of
being ￿nancially constrained.
In summary: ￿rms with more (less) valuable growth options should display
lower (higher) degrees of equity concentration; ￿rms which are more likely to
be ￿nancially constrained should have lower concentration than comparable
￿rms with less probability of ￿nancial constraints; for any ￿rm, concentration
increases as the expected volatility of short-term performance diminishes.
In parallel, I also show that straight debt does not implement the second
best, in absence of a large shareholder. The result owes to the fact that debt
does not enforce a state-contingent pay-o⁄, in spite of conditional control rights.
Although the framework is too stylised for a comprehensive analysis of debt, I
also make a case for mixed capital structure: when the maximal equity stake
of the blockholder is capped above, the second best is implemented by the
combination of a concentrated equity claim with straight debt.
The pay for luck phenomenon.
In a study based on US corporations, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000)
provide empirical evidence of a systematic relationship between CEO￿ s com-
pensation and exogenous uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty beyond the control of
economic agents). In other words, managerial compensation seems to respond
to luck, a ￿nding apparently inconsistent with the tenets of standard agency
theory. They also ￿nd a negative correlation between pay for luck and mea-
sures of corporate governance, among them the presence of a large shareholder.
The standard contracting approach posits that good governance mechanisms
implement e¢ cient incentive contracts which in turn rule out systematic forms
of pay for luck. Conversely, loose governance increases the extent of manage-
rial discretion, which in turn leaves the agents free to earn extra4 rents - the
so called skimming view. Bertrand and Mullainathan interpret pay for luck as
prima facie evidence for the skimming view, therefore for ine¢ cient levels of
governance.
4Extra in the sense of over and beyond the amount needed for e¢ cient incentives.
9In my set-up, pay for luck together with looser governance, under certain
conditions, emerges as an e¢ cient arrangement, i.e. as a feature of the e¢ cient
incentive contract. Financial constraints in the form of limited cash ￿ ows avail-
able for reinvestment are the driving force behind the result. As the probability
of ￿nancial constraints grows or, for given probability, the volatility of earnings
gets large, it is e¢ cient to implement a higher degree of managerial discretion,
which translates in a state-contingent rent for the manager, in the sense that
private bene￿ts increase with the value of short-term earnings. I show that pay
for luck is positively related to the growth options and to the degree of ￿nancial
constraints (and to the volatility of earnings), while it is negatively related to
the short-term performance. At the same time, the reverse implications hold
for the concentration of outside equity.
As a result, a lower level of equity ownership together with pay for luck
may be jointly an equilibrium arrangement, due to tougher incentive problems.
This result suggests that the ￿ndings by Bertrand and Mullainathan are not
necessarily evidence of governance failures. Rather, they can simply re￿ ect
contracting conditions conducive to an e¢ cient degree of pay for luck combined
with looser governance (reduced blockholder stake).
There is a large literature that has dealt with the disciplinary role of the cap-
ital structure and the ownership concentration. As discussed above, the most
related work is the one by Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997). Other related
papers are Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore (1995), who all ar-
gue that debt, markedly short-term debt, minimize the ine¢ ciencies related to
project selection and solves the control problem generated by free cash ￿ ows. I
challenge that view showing that debt fails to implement the e¢ cient allocation
of e⁄ective control powers at growth stage. In Zwiebel (1996), management
chooses debt structure to promote entrenchment: dividends can be part of the
pay-out policy when debt alone does not guarantee the minimal dynamic e¢ -
ciency needed to avoid dismissal. A similar view is adopted by Fluck (1999)
and Myers (2000), who explicitly focus on equity pay-out policy: dividends
are voluntarily set by management to the minimum level that keeps them in
control. I follow this approach, in that dividend pressure, as implemented by
a precise ownership pattern, acts as a commitment technology for entrenched
management.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2 and
10the second best solution is derived in Section 3. Implementation with an equity
claim only is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 brie￿ y considers the role of
debt and the case for mixed capital structure. Section 6 deals with the pay for
luck phenomenon. The last Section summarizes the main empirical predictions.
Longer mathematical proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model.
The model is cast in a simple framework of symmetric information and risk
neutrality. There are two types of agents, pennyless managers and outside
equity-holders, in turn distinguished in large and small shareholders. There are
three dates, t = 0;1;2. Risk-free interest rates are normalised to one in both
periods. Subjective discount factors are assumed to be one.
2.1 Manager
At t = 0, the manager is in charge of investing in a positive NPV project, that
delivers cash ￿ ows in the next periods. The existing technology requires the
manager to make a costly ￿rm-speci￿c investment e 2 [0;1] which a⁄ects long-
term performance. As a crucial assumption, e⁄ort, once exerted, is assumed
to be sunk inside the ￿rm, in the sense that it becomes incorporated in the
technology open to the ￿rm even if management is removed. E⁄ort is observable
but non veri￿able, so that no contract can be written contingent on it.
The ex-ante utility function of the manager is de￿ned in terms of (non trans-










where ij (j = l;h) is the amount of short-term cash ￿ ow not distributed and
reinvested in the venture. Private bene￿ts are increasing and concave in the
amount of retained earnings available for reinvestment, i.e. b0(i) > 0, b00(i) < 0.
5It is assumed that managers￿monetary bene￿ts at time 1 and 2 are ￿xed to a competitive
constant wage normalized to zero. The presence of a large pool of managers o⁄ering their
services at the competitive wage prevents the implementation of performance based rewards
to improve on the outcome.
11This speci￿cation aims to capture the nature of management interests in
presence of separation between ownership and control. In the tradition of Hart
and Moore, managers￿utility is proportional to the amount of resources directly
under their control, while, at the same time, they enjoy a rent for which they
can￿ t be made pay for (as in Jensen, 1986). A novel feature regards the timing.
While e⁄ort, intended as a metaphor for the human/speci￿c capital profused in
the venture, is exerted ex-ante in order to boost long-term pro￿tability, bene￿ts
appears only in the long-run, conditional on successful performance, in turn
related to the level of e⁄ort chosen.
2.2 Technology
At t = 1, stochastic short-term cash ￿ ows ~ y1 = fyl;yh; yl < yh; E(~ y1) = y1g are
realized with exogenous equal probability. Short-term performance is subject to
a level of uncertainty beyond managerial control: however hard she can work,
she cannot eliminate the riskiness due to macroeconomic or industry-speci￿c
uncertainty. Hence, she can be either lucky (yh) or unlucky (yl), independen-
tently on her chosen course of action. Then, for each realization of ~ y1, one of
two mutually exclusive states of the world is publicly realized. With probability
1￿e, where e equals the e⁄ort exerted ex-ante by the managerthere, is no con-
tinuation project available6 and the venture ends.Otherwise, with probability
e a long-term investment opportunity (continuation project or growth option)
arises at the end of time 1.
Depending on the amount of resources injected in the ￿rm at this stage (i),
the net value delivered at t = 2 is V2(i) = y2(i) ￿ i ￿ 0 8i. The technology
available to the ￿rm in the long-run, as a result of the e⁄ort profused by the
manager, is governed by the continuous and concave function y2(￿). For given
e⁄ort, ex-post NPV is maximised at i = ^ { such that y0
2(^ {) ￿ 1 = 0. After the
realization of state e, for j = l;h the manager announces the payout/investment
policy, i.e. a value ij of retained earnings to be reinvested. The di⁄erence
dj = yj ￿ ij represents the payout to investors at time 1.
6Otherwise, there is a liquidation value normalized to zero without loss of generality.
12Figure 1: Time Line
2.3 Shareholders
Equity-holders are interested in the security bene￿ts from the project, i.e.
E~ y1 [V (i(yj))je(i(yj))]:
On the opposite angle of the separation between control and ownership,
shareholders (ultimately the owners of the corporation) are endowed with costly
interference powers. At time 1, when uncertainty is resolved and the the payout
policy is announced, shareholders have the faculty to challenge the manager￿ s
decision. Speci￿cally, each shareholder can overrule manager￿ s payout decision,
and so require the ex-post e¢ cient level of dividend, equal to ^ dj = yj ￿ ^ {.
This intervention power, a direct prerogative of being the owners of the ￿rm,
comes at an exogenous cost c, taken to re￿ ect a number of factors such as
the legal framework, the regulation of ￿rms￿disclosure policy, the development
of ￿nancial markets, the transparency of the business, etc. Since the cost is
entirely born by the challenger while the gains are shared proportionally to each
shareholders￿stake in the ￿rm, free riding behavior by the small shareholders
implies that only a relatively large blockholder has e⁄ective intervention powers,
in the sense that her threat of intervention is credible, given her share of equity.
Therefore, the other crucial decision at time 0, together with the e⁄ort decision
by the manager, sees the large shareholder selecting her equity stake (￿)in the
￿rm. Finally, at time 2, the proceeds are realized and distributed.
The unfolding of events is represented in the time line in Figure 1.
This set-up creates a trade-o⁄ between incentives and control, much as in
13Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), while adding the multi-period element of
payout policy. The relevant control variable becomes the level of payout or,
symmetrically, the level of retained earnings. This additional feature enables
us to link the e¢ cient policy to ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics, like cash ￿ ows
volatility and growth options.
Notice that, at the inception stage, the manager enjoys full control over the
the operations and the intermediate cash ￿ ows, since it is the unique combina-
tion of these resources with her speci￿c skills that makes the ￿rm pro￿table.
Underlying the model, there is the idea that the contribution to the growth
of the ￿rm on behalf of the management tends to materialize in the long-run,
while the short-term is subject to less controllable ￿ uctuations. Put di⁄erently,
as the creation of value takes time to materialize, in the meanwhile uncertainty
can a⁄ect the project both in positive and negative ways. Long-term perfor-
mance remains only potential, to capture the unavoidable uncertainty intrinsic
to any economic venture. For the sake of tractability, I assume that the original
funding7 is fully embodied in the process by time 1, so that any further in-
vestment must come from the short-term earnings. The basic problem is about
the degree of managerial discretion over the cash accruing to the ￿rm in the
short-run. From an ex-ante perspective, the objective of long-run performance
(proportional to e) makes it e¢ cient to leave extended control over short-term
cash ￿ ows to the manager. Insofar she retains control, the pay-out decision falls
under her discretion. However ex-post, after e⁄ort is sunk, it is optimal to set
limits to such discretion. As a result, an optimal ownership structure strikes an
e¢ cient balance between the respective powers of managers and investors.
A natural question is about what speci￿c pattern of ownership structure and
security/control rights implements the second best.
7The participation constraint of the shareholders is not modeled. Implicitly, I assume that
the blockholder is never wealth constrained, so that for any stake and any amount of up-front
capital she can always provide the necessary capital. It then su¢ ces to assume that the
project has positive NPV at the optimal concentration, for the participation constraint of the
shareholders to have no relevance. Though this is justi￿ed by the focus of the paper on the
interplay between ￿rm fundamentals and ownership concentration, the explicit introduction
of shareholders￿participation constraint has important consequences that deserve separate
analysis.
143 The Second Best solution.
It is assumed that the maximum value exceeds the cost of investment, such that
the venture is economically viable. At time 0, the manager maximizes her ex-
pected utility over e for given ￿. The large shareholder maximises the value of
her share in the ￿rm by choosing ￿ given the reaction function of the manager
and subject to the additional constraint of ex-post incentive compatibility of
intervention (intervention vs. passivity)8. Under my modelling assumptions, I
can write the problem as a simple maximization program. The objective func-
tion is the expected value of the ￿rm (shareholders￿value), maximised subject
to the ex-ante incentive constraint of the manager and the ex-post incentive
constraint of the blockholder.
I initially solve the problem without the incentive constraint of the block-
holder, in order to check later on if there is some value ￿ that satis￿es the
relaxed program. Formally, the relaxed problem9 is:
max
0￿i(yj)￿yj;j=l;h
E~ y1 [V (i(yj))je(i(yj))] ￿
￿ max
0￿i(yj)￿yj;j=l;h










Due to the binomial distribution of ~ y1 and the separability of e⁄ort and time
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2
8This ex-post constraint supports the equilibrium threat that guarantees sub-game perfec-
tion of the equilibrium.
9To rule out the trivial solution e￿ = 1, it is assumed emax =
b(Yl)+b(Yl)
2 < 1.
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0(ih)[y2(ih) + y2(il) ￿ (il + ih)] + [b(il) + b(ih)][y
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2(ih) ￿ 1] ￿ 0
Since the gradient at ^ { = (^ {;^ {) is positive, any possible solution entails
i￿ = (i￿
l;i￿
h) ￿^ { = (^ {;^ {). The ￿rst term on the right hand sides, always positive,
represents the value creation e⁄ect of managerial incentives. The second term
measures the value destruction e⁄ect: for ij > ^ { , the expressions become more
and more negative, as a result of overinvestment beyond the zero NPV rule.
Basically, manager and investors￿ s objectives are perfectly congruent, from both
ex-ante and ex-post perspective, for ij < ^ {. For larger values, an ex-post clash
emerges. Notice, however, that the level of congruency of interests is not ex-
ogenous10 but depends on the available technology (y2(i)), the manager utility
(b(i)), and the degree of intrinsic uncertainty (~ y1).
Mathematically, there exists two11 possible solutions to the program above,
depending on parameters constellations. In the appendix I provide suitable
conditions on the parameters such that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 depending on parameters constellations, the second best is char-
acterized as follows:
Interior Solution (I). When the gradient vanishes at an interior point,
i￿
l = i￿
h = i￿ > ^ { and d￿
h = d￿
l + (yh ￿ yl);
10For instance, in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) it is captured by an exogenous
parameter, independent on technology and uncertainty.
11Actually, when the gradient never vanishes at an interior point of the domain, a third
type of solution attains, namely i￿
l = yl;i￿
h = yh and d￿
l = d￿
h = 0. However, it is of scarce
economic interest as there is no real ex-ante incentives vs. control trade-o⁄: the value creation
e⁄ect dominates everywhere. Though admittedly extreme, it may describe start-up ￿rms, for
which growth factors such as expenditures for R&D overshadow the extent of managerial
moral hazard. In this case, it is e¢ cient to reinvest all available cash ￿ ows so that nothing is
ever paid out.
16Constrained Solution (II).12. When ^ { < yl < i￿as obtained in (I), the
solution attains at i￿
l = yl < i￿;i￿ < i￿
h < yh and d￿
l = 0;d￿
h < d￿
l + (yh ￿ yl).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The optimal level of investment is always higher than the ex-post e¢ cient
level. Over-investment is the natural result of the incentives vs. control trade-
o⁄, under non veri￿ability of investment. Still, the solution depends endoge-
nously on ￿rms fundamentals. As the value destruction e⁄ect ultimately be-
comes stronger13, I obtain either an interior or a constrained solution, depend-
ing on the magnitude of short-term cash ￿ ows.
There are two driving forces behind the state-insensitive investment policy
and its symmetrical state-contingent dividend policy. On the one hand, the
concavity of the continuation project over the two states of nature l and h calls
for a state-invariant investment policy, i￿
l = i￿
h = i￿ > ^ {. On the other hand, the
concavity of the manager￿ s objective function makes the manager risk-averse
over the investment levels. Intuitively, the optimal solution is to provide full-
insurance to the manager, insofar it is feasible to do so (solution (I) above).
Under solution (I), risk-neutral shareholders e¢ ciently bear all undiversi￿able
risk stemming from exogenous uncertainty, while rewarding the manager on the
basis of her e⁄ort only. As a result, the pay-out policy acts as a shock absorber:
all short-term income volatility translates into the pay-out levels. The ex-post
ine¢ ciency is proportional to the distance i￿ ￿^ {: the more (less) important the
value creation compared to the value destruction e⁄ect, the larger (smaller) such
distance is. Solution (II) emphasizes the importance of cash ￿ ows uncertainty
on the optimal policy. It is best understood by comparison with the invariant
investment rule obtained at solution (I). When cash ￿ ows volatility is large,
insu¢ cient low state resources constraints the respective reinvestment below
its e¢ cient value. In essence, large short-term volatility of earnings imposes a
￿nancial constraint on the optimal course of action. Furthermore, this ￿nancial
constraint creates a distortion in the ex-ante provision of incentives, resulting
in the optimal level of high state reinvestment to be set above i￿.
12Though qualitatively identical, I rule out the case yl < ^ { as less meaningful from an
economic point of view.
13As the di⁄erence ij ￿^ { grows larger.
174 Implementation.
The analysis of Section 3 makes clear why ex-ante managerial control over ￿rm￿ s
resources is ex-ante optimal. The optimum is characterized by a reinvestment
vector i￿ ￿ (i￿
l, i￿
h) ￿ (^ {, ^ {), and, symmetrically, a pay-out vector d￿ ￿ (d￿
l,
d￿
h) ￿ (^ dl, ^ dh). Once determined the ex-ante e¢ cient level of investment, only
the exceeding part of short-term income has to be paid out to the investors.
The incentives to promote long-term value are proportional to retained earnings
available for reinvestment. The vector (i￿
l, i￿
h) determines the non-contractible






2 and the rent of the manager conditional
on successful performance. Hence the optimal solution is represented by the
couple (e￿;i￿).
A time-consistency problem arises, due to shareholders￿lack of commitment
not to intervene. The manager decides her e⁄ort based on her beliefs upon the
intervention power of outside investors at pay-out stage. Such beliefs must be
consistent with the investment rule she chooses at time 1. But, once at pay-out
stage, e⁄ort is sunk, and investors, if able to do so, would limit the resources
under managerial control to ^ { ￿ i￿, expropriating the managerial rent. Any
such attempt, if feasible, would be anticipated by the manager, who would in
turn reduce her level of e⁄ort to e(^ {) = b(^ {) < e￿. Therefore, allocating ex-ante
control to investors would reduce the intensity of the value creation e⁄ect and
lead to a suboptimal outcome. Shareholders cannot commit to any investment
policy larger than ^ {: any other promise they can make to the manager is not
credible. For the same logic, allocating formal control to the manager while
leaving costless intervention powers to investors leads to the same suboptimal
outcome. As laid out in the discussion above, its straightforward implication is:
Corollary 1 Setting the cost of investors intervention c = 0 does not im-
plement the Second Best, indeed:








The corollary simply re￿ ects the nature of the hold up problem induced by
the separation between ownership and control, and the lack of commitment
thereof.
Maximization of value requires the manager to enjoy decisional powers over
the use of internal resources. Because of this discretion, she engages in costly
18value creation activities, which in turn generate a rent. Since her contribution
to long-term growth remains sunk inside the ￿rm, this rent must be protected
from investor interference, even though, ex-post, curbing managerial private
bene￿ts has a positive e⁄ect on the overall value. A positive cost of sharehold-
ers￿intervention exactly safeguards managerial incentives by limiting excessive
investors￿interference. In essence, it confers e⁄ective status to the formal con-
trol allocated to the manager.
On the other hand, if the manager was left unconstrained because of loose
investors control, ex-post she would ine¢ ciently boost her rent expanding the
reinvestment up to the maximum feasible value14. In this instance, the value
destruction e⁄ect would dominate due to excessive investors￿passivity. To avoid
the extreme of total passivity, the cost of intervention must then be not too large,
as stated in the following Assumption.
Assumption 1 After the management has announced the pay-out policy
and uncertainty is resolved, investors can challenge that choice at a given cost c




The assumption simply states that the cost of intervention is smaller than
the minimum gain from intervention, thus ruling out the extreme case of stock-
holders total passivity. For the sake of clarity, Figure 2 summarizes the events
taking place at time 1.
Overall, a mechanism of control-switch is needed to make (e￿;i￿) ex-post
enforceable. Ex-ante the manager is allocated the control over short-term cash
￿ ows, while a credible threat of intervention from investors must trigger inter-
ference in case of deviations from the e¢ cient pay-out policy. As a result, the
optimal contract speci￿es not only a stream of payments (Rj) but also a pattern
of control rights (CRj
15) that together support the sub-game perfection of the
solution. On the basis of the results of Proposition 1, I can state the properties
14Of course, the presence of an external discipliner would set un upper bound on the
maximum level of reinvestment. As the dynamic e¢ ciency of the ￿rm falls below a threshold,
the conditions for a pro￿table hostile take-over could be satis￿ed. In this sense, the model I
develop best ￿ts a ￿nancial and institutional environment where the external threat is below
the level that guarantees the maximization of value.
15CR is an indicator function that takes value 0 when the manager is unchallenged and value
1 when shareholders intervene (when they are e⁄ectively in control, i.e. when Rj(yj;e￿) < dj).
19Figure 2: Events at time 1
of the optimal contract in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The optimal contract is a vector of income streams and a pattern











1 for R1(yl;e￿) < d￿
l




1 for R1(yh;e￿) < d￿
h
0 for R1(yh;e￿) ￿ d￿
h
.
I can notice three main features of the optimal contract:
(i) state-contingent income streams at time 1, depending on the realization
of ~ y1;
(ii) conditional and state-contingent control rights16 at time 1;
(iii) residual claim over time 2 value.
Such a contract shares features of real life ￿nancial contracts. Conditionality
of control rights is normally associated with debt, where default is triggered
16Control rights are conditional on the pay-out level decided by the manager: the manager
remains in control when dj > d￿
j forj = l;h, when the pay-out falls below this treshold the
shareholders are in control. Control rights are also state-contingent since the minimal pay-




20when the contractually stated repayments are not met. State-contingency with
respect to the realized cash ￿ ows is a typical feature of dividend payments on
equity. The residuality of the claim is a typical feature of equity, as well.
I now turn to the implementation of the optimal contract. It is clear that
the capital structure operates as a committing technology that ￿ne tunes the
e⁄ective control rights with the e¢ cient pay-out rule. For the present purposes,
equity is a title to the ownership of the ￿rm, proportional to the stake owned,
which delivers unconditional formal control rights. However, the level of div-
idends remains a discretional choice of the management, as far as it retains
control. The analysis focuses on the optimal degree of concentration/dispersion
of equity, in the hypothesis that large shareholders enjoy the same income rights
of the small ones, even conditional on intervention.
Proposition 2 Depending on parameter constellations, the Second Best (as
determined by Proposition 1) is implemented by a unique equity concentration
value:
Interior Solution (I). ￿￿ = c
[y2(^ {)￿^ {]￿[y2(i￿)￿i￿];





Proof. See the Appendix.
The ownership stake ￿, selected by the blockholder at time 0, guarantees
the credibility of the threat of intervention in equilibrium. Its value is related
to ￿rm fundamentals and to the ex-post gains from intervention.
Under symmetric information, shareholders￿intervention restores the ex-
post zero-NPV level of reinvestment, ^ {, thus increasing also the pay-out up to
^ dj = d￿
j +(i￿
j ￿^ {). Assumption 1 precisely states that the cost of intervention is
smaller than the total gains. The phenomenon of free-riding is obvious. While
the cost is born privately, the gain form intervention is shared with the other
passive investors. In essence, the blockholder￿ s stake confers e⁄ective status to
the formal control rights of outside equity-holders. The intervention constraint
of a blockholder with a stake ￿ of equity capital states that the her net payo⁄
from intervention, proportional to ￿, is equal to her payo⁄ in case of passivity.
Hence, only an appropriately large equity stake allows the constraint to hold.
Notice that the gain is increasing in the investment level i￿. Given that i￿
h ￿ i￿
l,
17The subscript sigma is a reminder of the e⁄ect of cash-￿ ows uncertainty on the concen-
tration.
21strictly so in the case of Solution (II), it follows that that the optimal ex-ante
concentration must be computed with respect to the high state.
Formally, the value ￿ needed to implement the desired solutions is implicitly
determined by the following equation, where the left hand side is the pay-o⁄
upon intervention and restoration of the optimal investment rule:
￿
h
^ dh + y2(^ {)
i


















As in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), the value of the ￿rm is non-
monotonic in the concentration of equity, and attains its maximum for an inte-
rior concentration. Higher stakes have a negative impact on managerial incen-
tives, while lower stakes lead to excessive shareholder passivity, in turn allowing
the manager to appropriate resources in the pursuit of private bene￿ts. Notice
that intervention remains only potential, since the manager does not have in-
centives to deviate from the e¢ cient pay-out policy. The threat of intervention
exerted by a large shareholder translates into a dividend pressure that puts an
e¢ cient bound on the power conferred to the management at origination. In
the same vein of Zwiebel (1996), Fluck (1999) and Myers (2000), management
sets the dividends to the minimum level that allows her to retain control.
The equilibrium outside equity concentration is proportional to the pay-out
pressure speci￿ed in the optimal contract. Firms with larger net bene￿ts from
managerial control should display lower concentration (higher managerial dis-
cretion) and the converse. The allocation of e⁄ective control rights, with a
relatively large shareholder to overcome the free-riding problem, commit the
parties to the optimal outcome. The intensity of the parties￿e⁄ective control
rights may be di⁄erent between the high and low states18: indeed, at the Con-
strained Solution (II) intervention must be triggered in the high state and not
in the low state, where the optimal investment rule satis￿es i￿
l = yl.
The comparative statics with respect to the growth option and earning
volatility yields the following results:
Corollary 2. (1) A parallel shift upward (downward) of the function y2(i)
decreases (increases) ￿￿: @￿￿
@y2 < 0; the same attains for b(i): @￿￿
@b < 0. (2) A
18See the Appendix.
22mean preserving spread in the distribution of the short-term cash ￿ows (weakly)
decreases the optimal concentration value.
Proof. (1) Solution (I). By simple inspection of the Foc at i￿
h = i￿
l = i￿ @V
@ih(i￿) ￿
@V
@il(i￿) = b0(i￿)[y2(i￿) ￿ i￿] + b(i￿)[y0
2(i￿) ￿ 1] = 0 I see that @i￿
@y2 > 0 and @i￿
@b >




2(i￿)c < 0 at the intervention
constraint. The same reasoning applies for solution (II), where the relevant Foc
is @V
@ih(yl;i￿
h) = 0 (eqn.2 in the Appendix).
(2) It is just a restatement of Proposition 1. As ￿ ￿ (1=2)(yh￿ yl) grows
large, ultimately I end up in the case of solution (II), namely where yl = yh￿
2￿ < i￿.
Firms with higher growth options, where future pro￿tability is strictly linked
to managerial e⁄ort (human capital intensive), or, generally, where the expected
time pattern of pro￿ts is upward sloping should have, ceteris paribus, lower levels
of optimal concentration and higher managerial discretion. This case seems to
be relevant for innovative or high-tech ￿rms, as well as for mature ￿rms in
the aftermath of a corporate crisis, when most of the value is prospective and
stemming from the ability of the newly appointed management.
Firms whose performance is, ceteris paribus, more subject to uncontrollable
￿ uctuations should have more powerful managers, smaller blockholders and ex-
hibit a higher correlation between investment and cash ￿ ows. It seems appro-
priate to include in this category ￿rms operating in the oil and raw materials
sectors, ￿rms more open to foreign competition and, in general, ￿rms with a
core business focus, unable to reducing idyosincratic risk by pooling cash ￿ ows
from di⁄erent operating units.
Finally, the model predicts the e¢ cient pay-out ratio (dj=yj) to be higher for
for ￿rms with comparably lesser growth options. This result seems to suggest
a larger strategic role for blockholders in ￿rms with a relatively constant time
pattern of pro￿ts (like widely diversi￿ed groups, conglomerates, utilities).
5 Debt vs. Equity.
In my framework, the combination of ex-ante incentives for potential growth
and short-term uncertainty implies that to achieve the Second Best it is needed
a short-term claim whose payo⁄and control rights are both cash ￿ ow sensitive.
The blockholder claim exhibits both features. What is crucial is the residuality
23of equity. Indeed, only a residual claim can satisfy the intervention vs. passivity
constraint, in that its payo⁄is increasing in the amount of resources available for
distribution. It is instructive to consider what would happen in the case when
all shareholder are atomistic but short-term debt is a feasible contract. For
our purposes, debt is a claim with a ￿xed, contractually stated pay-o⁄(interest
and face value) prior to any repayment to equity-holders. Its control rights are
conditional to the event of default.
Corollary 3 Absent a blockholder, debt alone does not implement the Second
Best.
Proof. Let D the debt repayment due at time 1. For any value of short-term
debt D ￿ d￿
l, pay-out is no longer state-contingent: dl = dh = D. The expected
value becomes
y1 + (1=4)[b(yl ￿ D) + b(yh ￿ D)][y2(yl ￿ D) ￿ yl + y2(yh ￿ D) ￿ yh + 2D]
Since ih(D) = il(D) + (yh ￿ yl); then either ih(D) 6= i￿
h or il(D) 6= i￿
l or both.
Hence, maxD E~ y1 [V (ij(D))je(ij(D))] < E~ y1 [V (ij(￿￿))je(ij(￿￿))]:
A ￿xed debt-like claim is not ￿ exible enough. A well known bene￿t of debt
lays in its ability to force management to pay-out free cash ￿ ows, as enphasized
by Jensen (1986). It is certainly the case in the model. However, debt repay-
ments are contractually stated: they cannot be made state-contingent on the
realization of short-term income. As a result, for any debt repayment due at
pay-out stage, there will be ine¢ ciencies that prevents the implementation of
e￿. According to its level, debt acts either too soft or too tough on manager-
ial incentives. Notice that long-term debt, due at time 2, is of limited utility
in the model, as the intervention threat must be e⁄ective at time 1 and must
internalize the e⁄ect of investment on the continuation project.
Altough the model is too stylized for a comprehensive treatment of debt,
once I assume that debt ￿nancing is feasible, I can make a case for mixed
capital structure. Denote as I the upfront investment in the venture and W
the maximum amount of funding that can be committed by a large shareholder.
Furthermore, assume:
Assumption 2. ￿￿ > W=I ￿ ￿￿ (I ￿ d￿
l)=I.
Assumption 2 states that the large shareholder￿ s funding is limited by a
wealth constraint, perhaps because of the underdiversi￿cation arising from hold-
24ing a large stake in the ￿rm, or due to some form of credit markets imperfection.
Now, a pure equity capital structure can no longer implement the optimum. The
maximum feasible dividend pressure is too low to implement the dividend pay-
ments (d￿
l;d￿
h). Introducing short-term debt relaxes the constraint, by reducing
the amount of cash available for dividend distribution.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 2, an equity only capital structure does not
implement the Second Best. Instead, a mixed capital structure implements the
second best. Short-term prior risk-free debt is set to a value D￿ 2 (0;d￿
l] such
that ￿￿(I ￿ D￿) < W.
Proof. The intervention vs. passivity constraint of the blockholder is unchanged
by short-term debt:
￿






For any amount of equity funding, concentration is constant at the value
determined by the di⁄erence in time 2 NPV [y2(^ {) ￿^ {] ￿ [y2(i￿
h) ￿ i￿
h]. How-
ever, risk-free debt reduces the total amount of equity capital. Ultimately, given
Assumption 2, there is a value D￿ 2 (0;d￿
l] such that ￿￿(I ￿ D￿) = W.
Basically, short-term debt cooperates with the large shareholder claim19 in
order to exert the e¢ cient pay-out pressure. Actually, the leverage e⁄ect in-
creases the expected return on equity, since RE(D;￿￿) ￿
y1￿D+e￿[y2(i￿)￿i￿]
I￿D is
increasing in D, short-term debt should be set at the maximum feasible value,
i.e. D￿ = d￿
l, in order to maximize the return on equity.
Therefore, as argued by Hart (2001) a mixed capital structure makes ￿nanc-
ing possible under circumstances when a pure equity capital structure does not
make it feasible. Bearing in mind the results in Proposition 1, it is possible to
state the following empirical prediction:
Leverage ratio is (weakly) negatively correlated with the volatility of short-
term cash ￿ows20. Furthermore, leverage is (weakly) positively correlated with
19In this instance, the enforceability of the debt claim is guaranteed by the priority rule,
even if intervention given default is costly and no further conditions are assumed. Indeed,
the debt claim is protected by the blockholder threat. Defaulting on debt and reinvesting the
unpaid cash decreases the large shareholder payo⁄ under passivity. This event automatically
triggers the block-holder intervention, that in turn restores the debt payment as by the priority
rule. Hence, the manager has no incentives to (strategic) default.
20Ultimately, as volatility grows large and dl ! 0, there is no role for short-term debt, as
evident from Constrained Solution II.
25the amount of funding I.
Empirical studies21 provide evidence of a positive correlation between lever-
age ratios and the size of the ￿rm. If the magnitude of I is taken as a proxy for
the size of the ￿rm, the result matches the empirical ￿ndings.
Another bene￿t of debt lays in its ability to curb private bene￿ts in case
of unexpected shocks on short-term cash ￿ ows. As an illustration, consider
a ceteris paribus decrease in low state cash ￿ ows after e⁄ort is sunk. Under
pure equity capital structure, the manager will simply decrease one-to one the
dividend, as the blockholder intervention vs. passivity constraint is una⁄ected
from such decision. Instead, under mixed capital structure, debt would constrain
the manager to decrease the low state reinvestment value, which is exactly the
ex-post e¢ cient choice.
6 Financial constraints matter
Provided that the cost of intervention is never too large, the second best can be
implemented whereby an appropriate pattern of equity ownership. The optimal
concentration ￿￿ de￿nes the ex-ante e¢ cient vector of investment i￿and pay-out
d￿, respectively larger (smaller) than the corresponding ex-post e¢ cient values.
However, the features of the second best solution depend critically on the
degree of exogenous uncertainty. Indeed, insofar parameters constellations are
such that yl > i￿, the only e⁄ect of uncertainty regards the pay-out policy.
The equilibrium ￿￿ implicitly de￿nes a state-contingent dividend pressure that
forces the manager to pay-out all the cash in excess of the constant level of
investment. Uncertainty translates entirely in the pay-out levels. As for the
manager, she is given full insurance with respect to the two states of nature l
and j. This is equivalent to maximal incentives for e⁄ort provision since the
concavity of managerial utility makes her endogenously risk-averse with respect
to the investment levels. In equilibrium she is not rewarded for luck, as agency
theory predicts.
This is no longer the case as yl < i￿, when the interior solution with full
insurance is no longer feasible. Here exogenous uncertainty displays its full
force by imposing a constraint on the self-￿nancing of investment: as a result,
the manager must bear some risk. As ￿nancial constraints bite, shareholders
21See, for instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995).
26are left with the sole option of minimizing, given the technology and e⁄ort
parameters, the extra risk added to managerial rent. The result is a higher
value of equilibrium investment following good luck (yh) than following bad
luck (yl), and higher than the value under the full insurance solution (I)22:
yl = i￿
l < i￿ < i￿
h < yh. As for the concentration, the equilibrium ￿￿ is set to
a lower ￿￿ which trades-o⁄ the value creation vs. the value destruction e⁄ect
with respect to the h state only.
In equilibrium, manager￿ s rent becomes state-contingent in short-term cash
￿ ows: the more cash is in the ￿rm in the high state, because of sheer good
luck, the more the manager invests and thus the higher the private bene￿ts
she obtains. Therefore, the ultimate e⁄ect of ￿nancial constraints is to induce
a systematic relationship between uncertainty beyond managerial control and
compensation on the one hand and to decrease the equilibrium level of concen-
tration (intervention threat) on the other hand. Still, it is ex-ante e¢ cient to
do so.
6.1 Pay for luck and equity ownership
The interpretation I provide in this section depends on the reader￿ s willingness
to consider private bene￿ts as a legitimate form of managerial remuneration. I
make an analogy between (increasing) private bene￿ts and pay for luck, although
what really matters is that managerial discretion over the control of cash ￿ ows
(hence her compensation) is state contingent, i.e increasing with short-term
exogenous uncertainty.
In this section I slightly modify the benchmark model, always under the con-
ditions of Solution (II) when ￿nancial constraints are binding, namely yl < i￿,
where i￿is the state insensistive optimal reinvestment values under the Interior
solution (I). I aim at investigating the e⁄ects of a higher ex-ante probability of
the ￿rm being ￿nancially constrained at reinvestment stage.
Speci￿cally, let the probability of yh equal to p 2 (0;1=2), i.e. 1￿p 2 (1=2;1)
is the exogenous probability of being ex-ante ￿nancially constrained. Notice
that now, for any couple (il;ih) such that ih > ih both E(V2;p) = [p(y2(ih) ￿
ih)+(1 ￿ p)(y2(il)￿il)] > E(V2;1=2) and e(p) = pb(ih)+(1￿p)b(il) < e(1=2)
22For this and the following result on concentration, refer to the proof of Proposition 1,
solution (II), in the Appendix.
27as p < 1=223. Hence, as p < 1=2, the overall expected time 2 value of the
￿rm is larger (since the state of the world where overinvestment is more intense
has a lower probability) while the e⁄ort level is smaller, when compared to the
benchmark symmetric case p = 1=2. I can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 At the ￿nancially constrained Solution (II) i￿
l(p) = yl; state h
investment and concentration satisfy, respectively:
i￿
h(p) > i￿
h(1=2) as p < 1=2,
￿￿(p) < ￿￿(1=2) as p < 1=2
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result strenghtens the previous ￿nding. Not only pay for luck emerges
as part of the optimal contract when ￿nancial constraints are binding, but the
intensity of pay for luck is also positively related to the probability of ￿nancially
constrained24. Intuitively, the incentives vs. control trade-o⁄ is tilted in favor
of the former. In fact, from an ex-ante perspective when the high state has
a lower probability, the negative impact of over-investment is more contained
whereas e⁄ort provision declines. Therefore, the lower negative impact of man-
agerial control over short-term resources calls for a larger degree of discretion
and thus a lower equity concentration. In turn, this implies that the pay for
luck phenomenon is stronger25.
In the model, pay for luck and looser governance, as implemented by the
internal discipliner of equity concentration, go hand in hand. Lower investors
￿ control and higher managerial discretion are the equilibrium result of a con-
strained incentive problem, i.e. when ￿nancial constraints are binding and thus
there is no room for e¢ cient risk-sharing. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000),
based on the tenets of agency theory, conclude that empirical evidence of pay for
luck is a prima facie case for the validity of the skimming view as opposed to the
contracting view. In a nutshell, the skimming view sees CEO￿ s as agents with-
out principals, left free, by the inadequacy of extant governance mechanisms,
23Notation follows unambigously: V2(p), e(p), ih(p) and ￿￿(p) are, respectively time 2 ex-
ante value, e⁄ort, investment and concentration levels in the given probability p; V2(1=2),
e(1=2), ih(1=2) and ￿￿(1=2) the corresponding values for p = 1=2.
24Pay for luck is also obviously negatively related to the realisation of short-term earnings
in the low state: ceteris paribus, the lower yl the more constrained the respective investment
and correspondingly higher the reinvestment in the high state.
25As shown in the appendix, the opposite happens for p > 1=2, for symmetric reasons.
28to appropriate resources irrespective of their e⁄ective contribution to the value
of the ￿rm. Their conclusion seems strenghtened by their ￿nding of a negative
correlation between pay for luck and measures of governance, including equity
concentration. However, I show that, under certain conditions, the negative
correlation between pay for luck and equity concentration is itself a feature of
the equilibrium arrangement. This ￿nding suggests the logical chain ￿ failures
of governance mechanism imply excessive managerial discretion which implies
pay for luck￿is neither necessarily true nor necessarily supportive of the skim-
ming view. Indeed, looser governance mechanisms may well be the equilibrium
response to the characteristics of certain ￿rms: in this sense ￿ loose￿stands for
￿ best￿ ! In the light of these ￿ndings, a more powerful test of the contracting vs.
the skimming view should focus only on those industries for which the theory
does rule out (any extent of) pay for luck, namely those that tend not to be
￿nancially constrained or exhibit very low cash ￿ ow uncertainty.
7 Conclusion
This piece of work investigates the role of internal discipliners in the form of
optimal equity ownership for the purpose of committing the management to the
pursuit of shareholder value in the presence of separation between ownership and
control. The analysis builds on the model developed by Burkart, Gromb and
Panunzi (1997), who show that a concentrated equity claim maximise the value
of the ￿rm. I extend the original set-up (i) by explicitly rooting the con￿ ict of
interest between managers and shareholders on the control of internally gener-
ated cash ￿ ows and (ii) by taking into account the role of earnings volatility
and ￿nancial constraints at growth stage. As a result, I establish a number of
results and empirical predictions that link investment policy and optimal equity
concentration to ￿rm characteristics.
First, the optimal ￿nancial contract exhibits state-contingency of both secu-
rity and control rights. It can be uniquely implemented by an interior concen-
tration value. This optimal concentration is negatively related to the growth
options of the ￿rm and positively related to the level of short-term cash ￿ ows.
It is negatively related to the riskiness of the ￿rm, as captured by the volatility
of short-term cash ￿ ows. Importantly, optimal equity ownership is negatively
related to the probability of the ￿rm being ￿nancially constrained, in the sense
29that the level of desired investment exceeds internal resources. I also show
that straight debt alone does not implement the second best, in absence of a
large shareholder. Nonetheless, under certain conditions, a combination of a
concentrated equity claim together with straight debt is the e¢ cient solution.
Second, when ￿nancial constraints are binding, the optimal contract is shown
to involve a positive correlation between cash ￿ ows exogenous randomness and
managerial utility. I interpret this ￿nding as an optimal endogenous level of
pay for luck, a phenomenon analysed by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000).
Crucially, pay for luck is associated in equilibrium to a lower optimal degree of
ownership concentration. Pay for luck is also negatively related to the level of
short-term cash ￿ ows and positively to the probability of being ￿nancially con-
strained, while the reverse holds for concentration. In other words, pay for luck
and looser governance, as implemented by the internal discipliner of equity con-
centration, emerge as the equilibrium result of a constrained incentive problem.
This ￿nding suggests that, under certain conditions, looser governance arrange-
ments may be the equilibrium response to the characteristics of certain ￿rms.
Contrary to standard tenets of agency theory, in such cases loose governance
can be an e¢ cient equilibrium feature.
Looking forward, the predictions of the model appear worthy of empirical
analyisis.
Finally, some caveats are in order about the generality and robustness of the
results. First, the results of the model hinge on the assumed inability of the ￿rm
to raise external ￿nance at t=1. This modelling hypothesis seems in line with the
standard pecking order theory of the capital structure, whereby self-￿nancing
is the preferred and least costly option. Due to informational asymmetries
between insiders and outside investors, the ￿rm is unable to pledge any of its
time 2 expected pro￿ts to raise additional resources (via debt or equity) ex-post
or ex-ante, in order to overcome the ￿nancing constraints at time 1. Implicitly,
the model assumes that the cost of raising external ￿nance is large enough to
o⁄set any bene￿ts from the additional cash availability. In this light, the results
can be interpreted as underscoring the corporate governance impact of the cost
of external ￿nance. Second, the model also adopts a somewhat unconventional
assumption in that it assumes that short-term cash ￿ ows are entirely random
beyond the agent￿ s control while long-term cash ￿ ows depend directly upon
the e⁄ort exerted by the agent. A simple way to avoid this stark distinction
30would be to consider the realizations of yl and yh as interim liquidity shocks
(or as deriving from the performance of assets in place) rather than short-term
pro￿ts. Alternatively, the ￿rm￿ s technology could be modelled such that e⁄ort
a⁄ects the probability distribution of both26 short and long-term earnings. In
this case, the main results of the benchmark model would remain qualitatively
unchanged.
Nonetheless, future work should look into delivering more general results,
by improving the robustness to di⁄erent modelling assumptions as regards the
distribution and time pattern of pro￿ts, e⁄ort and investment.
26Speci￿cally, the ￿rm generates short and long-term pro￿ts with a probability that is a
function of both e⁄ort and chance. For instance, given p 2 (0;1), short-term earnings can
take values yh with probability ep and yh with probability e(1￿p). Likewise, gross long-term
pro￿ts, conditional on investment, can take values y2(ih) with probability ep and y2(il) with
probability e(1 ￿ p). It is easy to show that the ￿rst order conditions of the maximization
problem are not qualitatively a⁄ected by this alternative formulation.
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32Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1.
First, in order to rule out the economically uninteresting corner solution
(il;ih) = (yl;yh) I impose the following su¢ cient condition, that simply states
that investing all resources in the h state is never optimal:




0(yh)[y2(yh) + y2(il) ￿ yh ￿ il]+(1=2)[b(il)+b(yh)][y
0
2(yh) ￿ 1] < 0.
The characterisation of the solution depends on parameters constellation. I
show that there is either an interior solution or a constrained solution (with a
corner solution for investment in the low), depending on the magnitude of yl
with respect to the parameters.
Interior Solution (I). A necessary condition for the gradient of the re-
laxed Program to vanish at an interior point (il;ih) is that simultaneously (
y0
2(il) ￿ 1 < 0
y0
2(ih) ￿ 1 < 0
.)
(
il > ^ {
ih > ^ {













Now compute the ￿rst derivative of g(i). Over the relevant range i > ^ {,
negativity of [y0








It follows from the monotonicity of g0(i) over the relevant domain, that there
is only a unique value i￿that simultaneously satis￿es the First order conditions,
provided that i￿ < yl. To verify that il = i￿ = ih is indeed a maximum, I need




























2(ih) ￿ 1] + b
0(ih)[y
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2(il) ￿ 1]g < 0;8(il;ih) > (^ {;^ {):























It follows that il = i￿ = ih is the unique interior solution.
Constrained Solution (II). Let ^ { < yl < i￿. Now the First order con-
ditions can no longer vanish simultaneously. Reminding that @2V
@i2
l < 0, at the










2(yl) ￿ 1] > 0.
Because of the negativity of the Second order partial derivatives, it is optimal
to set i￿
h > i￿. The optimal i￿



















h) ￿ 1] = 0
Because of Condition (i) above, i￿
h < yh.
Proof of Proposition 2.
For both cases of Proposition 1, the optimal ownership pattern implements
the income and control rights de￿ned in Section 3.
34Interior Solution (I). In this case, the intervention constraint of the block-
holder must be binding in both states of the world, so that the threat of in-
tervention is credible in both states. Formally, the intervention vs. passivity
constraint must satisfy the following equations, for each realization of ~ y1:
conditional on yl : ￿
h
^ dl + y2(il)
i





conditional on yh : ￿
h
^ dh + y2(ih)
i





Since the optimal investment policy is state-insensitive, it follows that ^ dh ￿
^ dl = yh ￿ yl = d￿
h ￿ d￿
l, and the two equations collapse to the same one:
￿[y2(^ {) ￿^ {] ￿ c = ￿[y2(i￿) ￿ i￿]. Assumption 1 guarantees a well de￿ned con-
centration value ￿￿ = c
[y2(^ {)￿^ {]￿[y2(i￿)￿i￿] < 1.
Constrained Solution (II). In this case, i￿
l = yl < i￿
h, d￿
l = 0 and
d￿
h = yh ￿ i￿
h < (yh ￿ yl). Since investment is no longer constant over states of
the world, the gain from intervention is now larger in state h than in state l.
The intervention constraint must be binding only in the high state, upon the
realization of yh, while no intervention must be triggered following the realiza-




^ dl + y2(^ {)
i
￿ c < ￿[y2(yl)] , ￿[y2(^ {) ￿^ {] ￿ c < ￿[y2(yl) ￿ yl] (eqn. ii)
yh : ￿
h











Now notice that [y2(i￿
h) ￿ i￿
h] < [y2(yl) ￿ yl]. Therefore eqn. (iii) determines
the optimal ￿￿ = c
[y2(^ {)￿^ {]￿[y2(i￿
h)￿i￿
h] < ￿￿ < 1 such that eqn. (ii) holds with
strict inequality at ￿￿.
Proof of Proposition 4.
As p < 1=2, the Foc of the new (relaxed) Program are:
@V (p)
@il
= (1 ￿ p)fb
0(il)[p(y2(ih) ￿ ih) + (1 ￿ p)(y2(il) ￿ il)] +
35+ [pb(il) + (1 ￿ p)b(ih)][(1 ￿ p)(y
0




0(ih)[p(y2(ih) ￿ ih) + (1 ￿ p)(y2(il) ￿ il)] +
+ [pb(il) + (1 ￿ p)b(ih)][p(y
0
2(ih) ￿ 1)]g ￿ 0
Recall that, as p 7 1=2 for any couple (il;ih) ￿ (^ {;^ {) such that ih > il,
(a) p(y2(ih) ￿ il) + (1 ￿ p)(y2(il) ￿ il) ? (1=2)[(y2(ih) ￿ il) + (y2(il) ￿ il)]
(b) pb(il) + (1 ￿ p)b(ih) 7 1=2[b(il) + b(ih)].
For p < 1=2;inspection of the new Foc shows that, at the point (yl;i￿
h(1=2))
where i￿
h(1=2) is the optimal high state investment under the Constrained Solu-












h) = 0 is an i￿
h(p) > i￿
h(1=2).
Once shown that i￿
h(p) > i￿
h(1=2), the last piece of Proposition 4 regarding
concentration levels ￿￿(p) < ￿￿(1=2) is straightforward, according to the logic
in Proposition 2.
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